Kolmogorov complexity by Durand, Bruno & Zvonkine, Alexandre
Kolmogorov complexity
, Alexandre Zvonkine
To cite this version:
, Alexandre Zvonkine. Kolmogorov complexity. E´. Charpentier, A. Lesne, N. Nikolski. Kol-
mogorov’s Heritage in Mathematics, Springer-Verlag, pp.281-299, 2007. <hal-00347376>
HAL Id: hal-00347376
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00347376
Submitted on 15 Dec 2008
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Chapter 1
Kolmogorov Complexity
By Bruno Durand and Alexander Zvonkin
The term omplexity has dierent meanings in dierent ontexts. Computa-
tional omplexity measures how muh time or spae is needed to perform some
omputational task. On the other hand, the omplexity of desription (alled
also Kolmogorov omplexity) is the minimal number of information bits needed
to dene (desribe) a given objet. It may well happen that a short desription
requires a lot of time and spae to follow it and atually onstrut the desribed
objet. However, when speaking about Kolmogorov omplexity, we usually ignore
this problem and ount only the desription bits.
As it was ommon to him, Kolmogorov published, in 1965, a short note [10℄ that
started a new line of researh. Aside from the formal denition of omplexity,
he has also suggested to use this notion in the foundations of probability theory.
His idea was quite simple:
An objet is random if it has maximal possible omplexity.
The denition of omplexity uses the notion of an algorithm; this unexpeted
marriage of two a priori distant domainsin our ase, probability theory and
theory of algorithmsis also a typial trait of Kolmogorov's work.
1.1 Algorithms
The notion of an algorithm in quite reent. In 1912 (when neither omputers nor
programming languages existed) Émile Borel (see [19℄) used the phrase a formal
and preise automati rule desribing an objet whih we would now all an
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algorithm.
(1)
However, a mathematial theory of algorithms was developed only
in the 1930ies (by Turing, Gödel, Post, Churh, Kleene and others). The key
observation was the existene of a universal algorithm (see below); it allows to
prove easily that some problems (e.g., the so-alled halting problem that asks
whether a given algorithm terminates on a given input) are undeidable (annot
be solved by algorithms). Note that to prove the non-existene of an algorithm
that solves a ertain problem we need a mathematially preise denition of this
notion. When appeared, this notion beame a subjet of the theory of algorithms,
also alled theory of reursive funtions or theory of omputability.
The remaining part of this setion disusses some aspets of the notion of algo-
rithm; the reader not interested in these details may skip it and proeed diretly
to Setion 1.2.
It is rather diult to give a mathematial denition that aptures the intuitive
idea of an algorithm in its full generality; instead, we may dene a spei lass
of algorithms and laim that this lass is representative, i.e., that any algorithm
is equivalent to a ertain algorithm in this lass. (By the way, one of these lasses
was suggested by Kolmogorov.)
1.1.1 Models of omputation
A model of omputation formally desribes some spei lass of algorithms (the
lass of objets used as input/output data, how they are proessed, et.) Some
omputational models resemble programming languages while others look more
as a hardware desription. In any ase, we assume that omputational resoures
are unlimited (and forget that in real programming languages integers are usually
bounded, proessor arhiteture has a xed word length, et.).
(The study of resoures (time and spae) needed to solve a given problem is a
dierent eld alled omputational omplexity. Let us note that an important no-
tion in this eld, NP-ompleteness, was introdued at the beginning of the 1970ies
independently by three researhers, one of whom, Leonid Levin, is Kolmogorov's
student. The rst publiations by Levin were about Kolmogorov omplexity [21℄.
His short biography and a brief story how Kolmogorov inuened him may be
found in the book [17℄.)
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The history of the term algorithm is interesting in itself. This word is a derivative of the
name of a medieval Persian savant Al-Khw	arizm	 (787  . 850) who was the author of a book
through whih the Europeans learned the positional number system and the rules of arith-
meti operations (addition, multipliation, et.). The name of Al-Khw	arizm	 (whih means de
Khorezm, a town in Uzbekistan today alled Khiva) was transliterated in Latin as Algorith-
mus. The term algorithms meant at the beginning the rules of four arithmeti operations.
Then by extension it has got the meaning of any systemati method of omputation. Leibnitz
alled algorithms the set of rules of omputing dierentials and integrals. It is only gradually
that the word aquired its modern meaning; one hundred years ago this proess was not yet
nished. (Authors' note)
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Whih omputational model is the best one? This depends on our purposes. If
we want to write real programs, it is natural to use a real omputer and an appro-
priate programming language. On the other hand, if we want to prove theorems
it would be more onvenient to work with an abstrat model of omputation;
a very simple model, with a small number of primitives, would then be better.
However, there is no anonial model adapted for proofs sine dierent models
are more suitable for dierent results.
The most popular model is Turing mahine. It is rather easy to prove the univer-
sality of this model; however, we have to deal with many details onerning tapes,
symbols, representation of the transition table, et. There are many versions of
Turing mahines; the most ommon one was, by the way, presented by Post and
not by Turing.
Reursive funtions à la Churh give a more mathematial and attrative model
though the proofs of ertain basi theorems beome somewhat disouraging if not
frightening.
Markov algorithms are similar to rewriting systems for strings with termination
onditions; this is a model diult to manipulate (but well suited for the proof
of the undeidability of word problems).
The RAM (random aess mahines) model resembles von Neumann-style om-
puters. . .
Teahing the algorithms theory, one may hoose a dierent approah and not x
any spei model but rely diretly on the intuition of algorithms. More formally,
it means that we have to aept some properties of algorithms used in the proofs
as axioms. Then we do not need to go into umbersome details of a spei
omputational model; the prie is, however, that the list of axioms is open (e.g.,
if during the proof we need to establish the omputability of some funtion, we
just desribe informally its omputation and then add a new axiom saying that
this funtion is omputable).
1.1.2 All models of omputation are equivalent
Why do we believe that this or that omputational model orretly reets the
intuitive notion of an algorithm? This statement is usually alled the Churh
thesis (for a given omputation model): it laims that any omputable funtion
(omputed by an algorithm in the informal sense) is omputable in this model.
This assertion is not a mathematial one; it is a belief onerning the notion of
intuitive omputability. On the other hand, we an prove that these assertions for
dierent omputation models are equivalent, sine it turns out that the lass of
omputable funtions is the same for dierent existing models (Turing mahines,
reursive funtions, et.).
The name given to the thesis is rather inappropriate. Churh laimed that all in-
tuitively omputable total funtions are omputable in his model. A long ontro-
versy followed, in whih Gödel took sometimes surprising positions [1℄. The rst
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equivalene theorem for two dierent models (reursive funtions à la Churh
and Turing mahines) was established by Turing in his seminal artile, and the
thesis in its most general form was formulated by Post. Therefore, a more ap-
propriate name would be ChurhTuringPost thesis.
All this was done in the 1930ies, so why Kolmogorov might want to suggest a dif-
ferent omputation model in the 1950ies? His motivation ould be reonstruted
as follows. Though all omputation models mentioned above are equivalent, the
translation between them sometimes replaes one step in one model by a long se-
quene of steps in another one. For example, an addition may be an elementary
operation in some programming language while its implementation by Turing
mahine requires many steps.
Kolmogorov wanted to nd a model whose steps are elementary in the sense
that they do not allow natural deomposition into a sequene of simpler steps. On
the other hand, he tried to nd a most general (and natural) model among these
models. This means that elementary steps of any other model (if they are indeed
elementary aording to our intuition) should not require further deomposition
when translated into Kolmogorov's model.
1.1.3 KolmogorovUspensky mahines
The model suggested by Kolmogorov was later alled KolmogorovUspensky ma-
hines. These mahines are not related to Kolmogorov omplexity, but they are
related to Kolmogorov himself; hene we say a ouple of words about them.
The onguration (state of the omputation) of a KolmogorovUspensky mahine
is a graph; some node of this graph is delared to be ative. The program for
the mahine is a list of rules that say how this ative part should be transformed
and when the proessing halts. So the omputation step is indeed loal; it
deals with a nite size neighborhood of the ative node. On the other hand, the
topologial struture of the omputation an beome rather ompliated. This
may be onsidered as a disadvantage of the model sine it allows some ations that
are hard to perform in a physial spae. (For example, a KolmogorovUspensky
mahine an reate a labeled tree that provides an unreasonably fast aess to an
exponential amount of information.) So one may want to restrit somehow the
lass of allowed graphs [19, 8, 1℄. Later a version of this model was onsidered
by Shönhage (who used direted graphs with unlimited in-degrees). It seems
pertinent to mention here the development of the GASM (Gurevih Abstrat
State Mahines) whih were inspired by KolmogorovUspensky mahines but
have other goals and do not play a spei role in the lassial omputability
theory. The rst omplete desription of KolmogorovUspensky mahines may
be found in [11℄; a more modern presentation is given in [19℄.
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1.1.4 Universality
Now we are austomed to the idea that the same proessor an be used to per-
form dierent tasks if provided with a suitable program. However, this idea of
universal omputation was a nontrivial and very important step in the devel-
opment of the rst real omputers.
The same idea an be formally expressed as follows: there exists a universal
omputable funtion U of two arguments p and x. The universality means that we
an obtain any omputable funtion of x by xing an appropriate rst argument
p (a program for this funtion).
Why does a universal funtion exist? Imagine an interpreter of an arbitrary pro-
gramming language that onsiders its rst argument p as a program and exeutes
this program using x as its input.
1.1.5 Non-omputable funtions
The existene of a universal omputable funtion immediately brings us to a
paradox. Consider the funtion F (p) = U(p; p) + 1. This (unary) funtion is
omputable sine U is. It should then have a program assoiated to it (sine U is
universal); let us denote this program by q. What happens if we apply program
q to itself? By denition of U this gives U(q; q). On the other hand, sine q is a
program for F , the same result must be equal to F (q) = U(q; q) + 1. So we get
U(q; q) = F (q) = U(q; q) + 1, and this seems impossible.
The only way to explain this paradox is to reall that ertain omputations may
never terminate, so a program may ompute a non-total funtion. And the on-
tradition disappears if U(q; q) is not dened.
A similar argument shows that the halting problem is undeidable: there is no
algorithm that gets a program p and input x and tells whether U(p; x) is dened
(= whether the program p terminates on input x).
1.1.6 Bak to algorithms
Returning to pratie, let us note that the notion of a omputable funtion ap-
tures only one aspet of algorithmi pratie. For example, the behavior of a
real-time algorithm (suh as an operating system) is a more ompliated thing
than a mere funtion. The hoie of a orret mathematial model for this lass
of algorithms (very important for pratie) is a well studied but not fully solved
problem of theoretial omputer siene.
1.2 Desriptions and sizes
Any information may be enoded as a bit string (a nite sequene of bits). For
this reason, in what follows we assume that our algorithms deal with bit strings.
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Binary strings are also alled words in the alphabet B = f0; 1g, and the set of all
binary strings is denoted as B

. We identify B

with the set Z
+
nf0g = f1; 2; 3; : : :g
using the lexiographi order. (The empty word is assoiated with 1, then 0 7! 2,
1 7! 3, 00 7! 4, 01 7! 5, et.: a string u is assoiated with a natural number
that has binary representation 1u. For example, the word 00 orresponds to the
number 100
2
, i.e., 4.)
The length juj of a binary word u, i. e., the number of letters in it, is then equal
to the integral part blog u of the binary logarithm of the number assoiated with
u. (Note that juj stands for the length of the word u and not for the absolute
value of the orresponding integer.)
Denition 1.2.1. Let f : B

! B

be a omputable funtion. We dene the
omplexity of x 2 B

with respet to f as
K
f
(x) =

min jtj suh that f(t) = x;
1 if suh t does not exist.
In other terms, we all desriptions of x (with respet to f) all strings t suh
that f(t) = x; then the omplexity K
f
(x) is dened as the length of the shortest
desription.
The main problem with this denition is that the omplexity depends on the
hoie of f . It is unavoidable, but the theorem stated below (due to Kolmogorov
but already present, in an informal way, in the paper of Solomono [18℄) ex-
plains in whih way this dependene an be limited. This theorem was later
independently proved by Chaitin but does not appear in his rst papers on the
subjet [2, 3℄the priority laims have provoked a long and futile ontroversy
explained in [13℄.
Theorem 1.2.1 (Existene of an optimal funtion). There exists a om-
putable funtion f
0
(alled optimal funtion) suh that for any other omputable
funtion f there exists a onstant C suh that
8x K
f
0
(x)  K
f
(x) + C : (1.2.1)
(Note that the onstant C may depend on f but not on x.)
Proof. Let t be a shortest desription of x with respet to f , i. e., f(t) = x.
Then f
0
uses as a desription of x the pair (p; t) where p is a program that
omputes the funtion f . In this pair p has jpj bits and t has jtj bits, so the total
number of bits is jpj+ jtj, i.e., jpj+K
f
(x). So we let C = jpj. 
Remark 1.2.1. This argument needs some renement. We annot use the pair
(p; t) diretly; we need to enode it by a single string. Not any enoding will
work. An appropriate enoding may enode p in a very ineient waythis only
inreases the onstant C. On the other hand, it is essential to be able to enode
t without any loss of spae sine an enoding of t whih demands, say, jtj bits
with  > 1 leads to the omplexity K
f
(x) + C instead of K
f
(x) + C.
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Corollary 1.2.1. If f
1
and f
2
are two optimal funtions then there exists a
onstant C suh that
8x jK
f
1
(x) K
f
2
(x)j  C : (1.2.2)
Proeeding from this orollary, we hoose some optimal funtion f
0
and x it.
The subsript f
0
in K
f
0
is then suppressed. However, after doing this we still
have in mind that in fat the Kolmogorov omplexity is dened only up to a
bounded additive term.
Denition 1.2.2. The Kolmogorov omplexity K(x) is the omplexity K
f
0
(x)
with respet to some optimal funtion f
0
. The omplexity K(x) is dened up to
a bounded additive term.
Proposition 1.2.1.
K(x)  jxj+ C; or, equivalently, K(x)  logx + C : (1.2.3)
Proof. It sues to let f(x) = x in (1.2.1), i. e., to use x itself as a desription
of x. 
Proposition 1.2.2 (Distribution of omplexities). Consider all binary strings
of length n. The fration of strings x of length n suh that K(x) < n   k does
not exeed 2
 k
.
Proof. The number of strings of length n is 2
n
while the number of (potential)
desriptions of length less than n  k is
1 + 2 + : : :+ 2
n k 1
< 2
n k
:

There exist strings of length n whose omplexity is at least n (they are often
alled inompressible strings). Indeed, there are 2
n
strings of length n and at
most 1 + 2 + : : :+ 2
n 1
= 2
n
  1 potential desriptions of length less than n.
One may ask for an example of an inompressible string. However, it is not
possible to nd an inompressible string of length n eetively (having n as
input). Indeed, if it were possible, a string generated by this algorithm would
have omplexity logn +  sine we need to speify n (about logn bits) and the
algorithm itself (onstant number of bits), and logn +  is less than n for all
suiently large n.
Inompressible strings are a useful tool in theoretial omputer siene (automata
theory, formal languages, et.).
Today everybody uses software for data ompression and deompression; this
was not the ase in the 1960ies when Kolmogorov omplexity was introdued.
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However, the Kolmogorov omplexity theory may still provide useful hints: for
example, if a software advertisement laims that a latest version of the super-
ompressor ompresses every le by a ertain fator, you better avoid this prod-
ut.
Finally, to prepare for the next setion (on Gödel's inompleteness theorem), we
present a variation on a well known theme of busy beavers. Initially the busy
beaver numbers were dened as follows. Consider Turing mahines that have at
most n states and whose tape alphabet onsists of two symbols (say, blank and
stroke). We start suh a mahine on the blank tape. Some mahines do not
terminate at all. For the mahines that terminate we ount the number of steps;
let T (n) be the maximal number of steps among the terminating mahines with
at most n states.
Evidently, T (n) is an inreasing funtion of n sine we onsider all mahines
that have at most n states. It grows very fast; in fat, it grows faster that any
omputable funtion (does not have a omputable upper bound). Indeed, if a
omputable upper bound f(n) exists, it may be used to solve the halting problem,
sine we know that if a mahine with n states does not terminate after f(n) steps,
it will never terminate. So no omputable funtion, even a fast growing one, like
n!
n!



n!
(n! levels), is an upper bound for T (n).
But here we onsider a dierent (but related) fast-growing funtion. Let us dene
Æ(n) as the biggest integer that has omplexity less than n. It exists sine the
number of desriptions of size less than n is nite. By denition we have n  K(x)
for any x > Æ(n), e.g., for x = Æ(n) + 1. If the funtion Æ were omputable we
would have K(Æ(n) + 1)  logn + C sine n might serve as a desription of
Æ(n) + 1. The ontradition is evident. Hene, Æ is not omputable. In a similar
way we an prove that Æ grows faster than any omputable funtion. (It sues
to replae Æ(n) in the preeding inequalities by any omputable upper bound
for Æ.)
1.3 Gödel's theorem
1.3.1 It is proved that one annot prove everything
The funtion K(x) is not omputable. How an we use it? For example, to
prove theorems. Maybe the most remarkable example is the proof of Gödel's
inompleteness theorem. Roughly speaking, this theorem laims that not all the
truths are provable. Mathematis has its intrinsi limits: there exist propositions
that are true but impossible to prove.
We propose to you a more onrete form of a proposition that is true but
unprovable; it was suggested by Gregory Chaitin [4℄.
Theorem 1.3.1 (Gödel's inompleteness theorem). There exists a num-
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ber m suh that for every x the proposition
K(x)  m
is unprovable.
Note that the set of all x suh that K(x) < m is nite. So the proposition
K(x)  m is true for innitely many values of x. And all these truths have no
proof.
Proof of Gödel's theorem. We use the same argument as in the previous
setion (when we proved that the busy beaver funtion Æ(n) is non-omputable)
with some modiations.
Suppose that the statement is false, i.e., that for any integer m there exists x
suh that the proposition K(x)  m is provable. Then onsider an algorithm
that nds this x given m:
 input: an integer m;
 enumerate all the theorems (a theorem is a proposition whih has a proof);
 as soon as a theorem K(x)  m is found, return x.
Using this algorithm, we may onsider its input m as a desription of its output
x. Therefore, aording to (1.2.3), K(x)  logm + C. But, on the other hand,
K(x)  m is a theorem (and therefore is true; we assume that all theorems are
true, otherwise our notion of proof would be bad). So
m  logm + C :
The onstant C is absolute: it depends neither on m nor on x. So we get a
ontradition, sine this inequality is false for suiently large m. 
For a neophyte it is diult to appreiate fully this simple argument. One should
know, however, that Gödel's theorem had literally shattered the mathematial
ommunity at the beginning of the 1930ies. The projets and hopes of great
mathematiians, suh as David Hilbert, to get a omplete formal theory as a
framework for mathematis were redued to nothing. Gödel's theorem beame
(and remains) one of the basi results and one of the gems of mathematial logi.
(Numerous volumes are devoted to this theorem, inluding philosophial essays
and popular expositions; the bestseller by Douglas Hofstadter [9℄ has 800 pages.)
Generations of logiians tried to understand fully why and how mathematis is
inomplete. Due to all their work, we are now able to explain the proof of this
theorem in a single paragraph.
A philosopher one remarked that every profound idea passes through three
stages during its development: (1) it is impossible; (2) it is maybe possible but
inomprehensible; (3) it is trivial. It seems that Gödel's theorem has already
arrived to the third stage.
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1.3.2 Formal systems
Of ourse, our aount of the omplexity proof of Gödel theorem is quite informal.
An informed reader may be worried about this. He had probably heard the words
formal systems. Indeed, we speak about proofs and theorems but do not say what
the axioms or inferene rules are (or any other proof mahinery). It turns out,
however, that in fat we do not need to go into these details. There is only one
property of the proof system that is neessary.
Denition 1.3.1 (Formal system). A proof system is an algorithm that gen-
erates statements, and all these statements are true.
All usual proof systems (based on axioms and inferene rules) are formal systems
aording to the above denition. Indeed, theorems an be enumerated in the
following way: write all the strings of haraters in a ertasin order; for eah of
them hek whether it is a derivation (starts with axioms, follows inferene rules,
et.); if yes, nd the statement that has been derived (usually the last statement
of the derivation) and output this statement.
This assumes that there is an algorithm that an distinguish derivations from
other harater strings, but this is true for all reasonable formal systems. Oth-
erwise, how ould we hek that a proof is orret? (By a vote of members of a
jury? By asking an orale, a prophet or another sort of authority? By a tourna-
ment of knights like in Middle Ages? By drawing lots?) This is indeed the basi
underlying idea of a formal system; the orretness of proofs should be veried
mehanially, that is, by an algorithm.
1.3.3 Berry paradox
Gregory Chaitin, who suggested this remarkable proof, mentioned that this proof
is a formalization of the Berry paradox published by Bertrand Russell in 1908.
It onsiders
the smallest integer N whose desrip-
tion needs more than thousand words.
First of all, the integers that need more than one thousand words in order to
be desribed, do existjust beause the number of shorter desriptions is nite.
Therefore, the boxed sentene haraterizes the integer N without ambiguity; in
other words, it is a desription of N . But it ontains less than thousand words!
Quite often a paradox appears sine we refer to a notion not well dened. What is
this notion here? The notion of the smallest element (in a set of positive integers)
used in the phrase is well dened: the axiom of indution implies that every non-
empty subset of N has the smallest element. On the other hand, the notion of
desription is indeed not well formalized. Kolmogorov omplexity provides a
formal framework for this notion. Then, replaing words by bits, onsider (for
every m)
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the smallest integer N suh that K(N) > m.
Suh an integer exists for every m; however, this expression (for a given m) is not
a desription of N in Kolmogorov's sense, sine there is no algorithm that nds
this N . But if we hange the sentene and say
the rst integer N suh that K(N) > m is provable
(where rst means rst in the sequene of generated proofs), then it is indeed a
desription of omplexity logm+ , and the only way to avoid the ontradition
is to onlude that for some m there are no proofs of statements of the form
K(N) > m. As you see, we ome to the proof of Gödel's theorem explained
above.
1.3.4 Gödelian propositions: onrete examples
Good students often ask: is it possible to give a onrete example of an unprovable
proposition?
This question sets a trap for us. Without doubt, we mean a true but unprovable
proposition. But how, then, ould we know that some proposition is true if it has
no proof? Apparently, we should have other reasons, and very strong reasons, by
the way, in order to believe that it is true.
Logiians know dierent ways to address this problem. For example, we an
provide two statement A and not A that are unprovable. Then we know
that at least one of them is true but unprovable. (But this probably annot be
onsidered as a onrete example.)
The other possibility is to onsider dierent theories: a weak one (e.g., rst-order
arithmeti) and a stronger one (seond-order arithmeti or set theory). Then we
show a statement that is not provable in the weak theory, and this fat as well
as the statement itself an be proved in the strong theory.
This is the approah found by Gödel himself. He proved that by using only (rst-
order) arithmeti it is impossible to prove that this theory (rst-order arithmeti)
is onsistent, i. e., that it does not ontain a ontradition. But the onsisteny
of the (rst-order) arithmeti an be proved in the set theory or seond-order
arithmeti (and, last but not least, it is onrmed by mathematial pratie).
Kolmogorov omplexity provides us with another proedure of produingGödelian
(that is, true but unprovable) propositions. Let us suppose that the number m
in the Gödel theorem is, say, 100. (A areful reasoning an indeed provide some
spei value for m. It depends on the formal system we use and the optimal
funtion we hoose in the denition of Kolmogorov omplexity.)
Then we may toss up a oin, say, 500 times, and then laim that the omplexity
of the sequene of bits obtained is greater than 100. This statement will be
impossible to prove, but we may be pratially sure that it is true: the probability
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of getting a false statement in this way is less than 2
 400
(see the proposition about
the distribution of omplexities on p. 7). We thus obtain an arithmeti statement
whih we believe to be true for probabilisti reasons.
1.4 Denition of randomness
1.4.1 Questions, questions, questions...
The more we think about the notions of probability and randomness, the more
diult is to explain even the most basi things. Let us start by an example
borrowed from the everyday life. Suppose that you see a ar whose number on
the liene plate is 7777 ZZ 77. This number seems rather extraordinary, doesn't
it? As to the number 7353 NY 42, it seems perfetly normal. Why?
We would like to say: beause the rst number has very small probability. Yet,
this answer is not valid: the probability of the rst number is exatly the same as
that of the seond. If we suppose that all digits and all letters are equiprobable
and independent, then this probability is equal to 1=(10
6
26
2
). When we toss up
a oin 1000 times, the probability to get 1000 heads is 2
 1000
, but the probability
of every other sequene of heads and tails is exatly the same! Why then does the
sequene of 1000 idential tosses arouse a suspiion as to its random harater?
If we think more about this phenomenon, we nally understand that, in fat,
while speaking about ar numbers, we do not mean individual numbers but sets
of similar numbers. The rst number is a representative of the set of numbers
where the digits are repeated, and also the letters. This set is simple to desribe,
and its probability is small. As to the seond number, it is just a number. We
are unable to outline its spei simple property whih would desribe a set of
small probability. (And, if you are, this was not intended by the authors.) This is
related to omplexity: a simple property that is true only for few objets makes
these objets simple.
Now, let us go further: what is probability?
Despite what one might believe, probability theory (whose rigorous mathematial
foundation was provided by Kolmogorov himself in 1933) does not answer this
question. This theory formulates, in a form of axioms, the properties of probabili-
ties. It also permits to alulate probabilities of ertain events when probabilities
of other events are known. Thus, it treats probability theory just as any other
branh of mathematis, without bothering muh about useless philosophial
questions. People were quite satised by this situationexept for Kolmogorov.
How would you explain to an intelligent person with no mathematial bakground
what probability is? You laim that when one tosses a oin, the probability to
get a head is 1=2. Then he starts to question you:
 I don't understand the word probability in your sentene.
 I mean that the hanes to get a head or a tail are equal.
1.4. DEFINITION OF RANDOMNESS 13
 Hm. . . you've replaed the word probability by hane, but what does it
mean?
 OK, OK. I would only like to say that in, say, a thousand of oin tosses you
get approximately half of heads and half of tails.
 Ah. . . It seems that I begin to understand something. For the moment, I
won't ask you how preise this approximation is. But please tell me: do you
really guarantee that the fration of heads is always lose to one half?
 Alas, no. It is not always the ase, but it is true with a very high probability.
However, there remain extremely small hanes to get (for example) only the
heads.
 With a very high probability! Again this word! You started to explain what
probability is, but now you use the same notion in a muh more ompliated
ontext, that of 1000 tosses instead of one. Frankly, all that is not very serious.
 But wait, wait! I an give you axioms whih desribe the properties of prob-
abilities. . .
 To know the properties of something is ertainly very important. But it would
also be good, before speaking about properties, to understand what is the objet
whose properties we want to study. The sepulkas are used for sepulation, one
puts them in a sepulkary, they an be assembled in beads, and they are able to
wistle:
(2)
do you understand anything here?
 We've been talking for a long time already, but there still remains an approah
by whih I ould try to onvine you. You see, the property of having the pro-
portion of 0's and of 1's lose to 1=2 is true not only with a large probability; it
is also true for all random sequenes. The sequenes whih do not satisfy this
property are just not random.
 Is the sequene of alternating zeros and ones random aording to you?
 No, it is not. It is obviously too regular to be random.
 Then I don't understand at all what you are speaking about. What does the
word random mean?
 Mmm. . .
 Are there at least any axioms whih would desribe the properties of the
objets you all random?
 Mmm. . .
1.4.2 Random sequenes
The approah based on Kolmogorov omplexity permits to dene the notion of
an individual random sequene formally without any referenes to probabilities.
For innite sequenes of bits it provides a sharp boundary between random and
non-random sequenes. For nite sequenes (binary strings) we have no hope to
2
See Stanisªaw Lem, Memoirs of a spae traveller, London, 1982. (Authors' note)
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ahieve this sharp division. (Indeed, hanging one bit annot make a random
sequene non-random, but a sequene of hanges an.)
For a nite sequene, to be random is a synonym of having a omplexity lose
to the length. In other words, the best (or lose to the best) way to desribe
suh a sequene is to present it literally. Then we an prove that in a random
sequene the frequeny of zeros (and ones) is lose to 1=2. For example, onsider
a sequene of 1000 bits that ontains, say, 300 ones and 700 zeros. This fat
signiantly redues its omplexity, and therefore the sequene is not random.
(Indeed, we an say that this is a sequene that has number N in the list of all
sequenes that have 300 ones and 700 zeros, and one an see that the bit length of
N is muh smaller than 1000: N 

1000
300

hene logN  log

1000
300

< 877.)
So the random sequene should ontain approximately equal number of zeros
and ones. However, if we push the same reasoning a little further, we see that
if a sequene had exatly the same number of zeros and ones, we would also
have some nontrivial information about it, so it ould not be perfetly random.
For a truly random sequene, zeros and ones must be slightly unbalaned (the
dierene should be proportional to the square root of the length).
As we have said, aording to Kolmogorov's idea a sequene is random if it is
almost inompressible. However, omplexity is dened for nite sequenes.
Therefore to dene randomness for an innite sequene we need to onsider some
nite strings related to it. The most natural hoie is prexes.
If an innite sequene is denoted by x, let x
1:n
denote a nite string onsisting
of the rst n bits of x. We ould try the following denition: x is random if and
only if
9C 8n K(x
1:n
) > n  C :
The onstant termC is natural sine the omplexityK is dened up to an additive
onstant. Unfortunately, this denition does not work: there is no sequene x that
satises this requirement. Ten years passed before this diulty was resolved.
The solution is sometimes onsidered as a tehnial trik. However, what is
onsidered as a tehnial trik by mathematiians orresponds to a reality well
known to omputer sientists: we should distinguish between a program that
reads/writes a bit string (of a speied length) and a program that reads from
the (potentially innite) input stream or writes into the output stream. Storing
a le or a string, we should reserve additional plae to store its length or reserve
some symbol as a terminator. Both solutions require additional spae, at least
logn bits for keeping the length of an n-bit string.
There are dierent tehnial solutions; one of them is that we require our de-
sriptions to have the prex property: if a string t is a desription of some x,
then any ontinuation of t (i. e., any string that extends t) is also a desription
of x. So we do not need to say when the desription stops, sine the trailing
bits do not hange anything. If we modify the denition of the Kolmogorov om-
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plexity in this diretion (whih requires some preautions but is feasible), the
formula suggested in the previous paragraph beomes a reasonable denition of
randomness for innite sequenes. (Tehnially speaking, we may swith from
the plain omplexity to prex omplexity. This gives some other advantages;
for example, for this version of omplexity the omplexity of a pair of binary
strings (under any omputable enoding) does not exeed the sum of their om-
plexities. (This is not true for the original plain Kolmogorov omplexity where
an additive logarithmi term is needed.)
Another Kolmogorov's idea was to dene a random sequene as a sequene whih
esapes from every eetively null set. In order to dene the notion of an ee-
tively null set we take a usual denition of a null set (a set of measure zero) and
interpret the existential quantier in an eetive way (instead of mere existene
we demand that the required objet be provided by some algorithm). This gives
us the following denition:
A set A is an eetively null set if there exists a program p whih, for any integer
n given as input, produes an innite series of strings
x
(n)
0
; x
(n)
1
; : : :
suh that for all n
X
i
2
 jx
(n)
i
j
< 1=n
and for every w 2 A and for every n the sequene w has one of the strings x
(n)
i
as a prex.
This idea was developed by Martin-Löf [15℄, a student of Kolmogorov. The ee-
tively null sets orrespond to non-randomness tests, and a sequene is random
if it resists to all these tests. The existene of a universal algorithm allows us to
onstrut one universal test: every sequene whih resists to this test resists as
well to all other tests and is therefore random.
One of the prinipal results of the algorithmi information theory is the onne-
tion between the inompressibility of prexes of innite sequene and its random-
ness seen as resistane to every algorithmi test. This equivalene is a theorem
proved in the 1970ies by Levin and Shnorr [12, 16℄ in the ontexts of slightly
dierent denitions (they used some version of the so alled monotone om-
plexity; see [20℄ for the details). Thus a good denition of randomness (for an
innite sequene) was obtained; good means here that two dierent reasonable
denitions turn out to be equivalent. Moreover, all basi theorems of probabil-
ity theory that have the form for almost all x the property P is true an be
now reformulated as follows: for every random (in the sense desribed above)
sequene the property P is true. The latter result is not a formal statement; we
mean that dierent authors studied dierent theorems of this form (for example,
the ergodi theorem) and proved that these theorems remain true for every algo-
random sequene. In ertain ases (for example, for ergodi theorem), this is a
rather deliate work and about ten years were required to omplete it.
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The relation between omplexity and measure an be used also for nite se-
quenes. For example, we may prove that any inompressible sequene has some
property (by showing that sequenes whih do not have this property an be om-
pressed). Then we onlude that almost all sequenes have this property (being
inompressible).
1.4.3 Sequenes of low omplexity
We have seen that the sequenes that have prexes of high omplexity are random.
It is natural to ask whih sequenes have prexes of small omplexity. There
exists a nie theorem, proved independently by several authors long ago when
the theory of Kolmogorov omplexity appeared. Aording to the date of the
rst publiation, this theorem must be attributed to Albert Meyer and it was
published in a paper by Loveland [14℄. Its proof may be found in [21℄. Let us
state this result using the notation of the previous setion.
Theorem 1.4.1. A sequene x is reursive (i. e., omputable by an algorithm) if
and only if 9C 8n K(x
1:n
j n) < C:
We use here a slightly more generalnamely, onditionalform of Kolmogorov
omplexity. In order to simplify our presentation we did not mention it until
now, but it is a useful and natural notion. We dene K(x j y) (omplexity of
x while knowing y) as the length of the shortest desription of x, if desriptions
have aess to y as input. Formally,
K
f
(x j y) =

min jtj suh that f(t; y) = x;
1 if suh t does not exist.
The existene of optimal funtions is proved in the same way as before. If y is
xed, the omplexity K(x j y) as a funtion of x oinides with K(x) up to a
onstant so we get nothing really new (reall that the omplexity is dened up
to an additive onstant anyway). But this new notion makes sense, for example,
if we let y be the length of x (or the number of zeros in x, the substring formed
by bits with even indies, et.)
The theorem says that the simplest innite sequenes are exatly the om-
putable ones. It is important to use K(x
1:n
jn) and not K(x
1:n
) sine even for
a omputable x the prex x
1:n
ontains a small amount of information, i.e., the
length n. (Why didn't we add a similar term in the haraterization of random
sequenes? In fat this is also possible but not neessary.)
In one diretion this theorem is trivial: if a sequene is reursive then omplexity
is bounded (in fat, bounded by the omplexity of a program that produes x
1:n
given n).
The onverse impliation is more subtle. It is one of the examples that appear
from time to time in theoretial omputer siene, when it is possible to prove
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that an algorithm exists but it is impossible to onstrut it. In this spei ase
we an prove that the sequene is reursive but there is no omputable bound on
the size of the program generating x that depends only on C.
We an explain informally why this happens (see [6, 7℄ for details) in the following
way. Consider a sequene x that starts with a large number N of zeros that are
followed by 1, then some string z and then zeros again. Any program that
generates x gives us omplete information about z (we have only to delete the
leading zeros), and its omplexity is high if z has high omplexity. On the other
hand the omplexity K(x
1:n
jn) is low if n  N (sine only zeros appear in x
1:n
and an be low for n > N sine in this ase we know some number n greater than
N and this information may be useful for nding z.
1.4.4 Bak to the denition of randomness
Our denition of random sequene (in this setion we say algo-random) an
be ritiized from many dierent viewpoints. First, this denition uses the notion
of an algorithm that was never used in probability theory. It leads to a natural
question: is the notion of algorithm really neessary to give a reasonable denition
of a random sequene?
Seond, one ould note that some easily denable sequenes are algo-random.
For example, there exists a sequene dened by G.Chaitin (alled !) that is
algo-random. It is dened as follows. Consider an optimal algorithm in the sense
desribed in Setion 1.2, but in the self-delimiting version, and apply it to random
bits obtained by oin tossing. (This algorithm will atually use only nitely many
of these bits to produe the output.) The omputation may terminate or not,
depending on the hoie of random bits. Then ! is dened as the probability of
termination.
(3)
This sequene is (as Chaitin noted) an algo-random one, and this raises a question.
The proposition x 6= ! for almost all x is true (almost all sequenes dier
from !). However, we annot laim that x 6= ! for all algo-random x, sine !
is one of them. Even if this example seems to be a little artiial, a true problem
is raised.
The rst possibility is to hange the notion of algo-randomness, allowing a broader
lass of randomness tests. In this way we obtain a notion of arithmo-random
sequenes. Two formal denitions are possible: one onsiders the lassial theory
based on algorithms and then relativizes these algorithms using arithmetial or-
ales; the other one denes everything diretly using arithmeti formulas. These
two approahes lead to the same notion, whih orresponds to a smaller lass of
random sequenes. The problem is that this denition is not losed: there is no
3
Similar experiment was performed at the early stages of Unix development. Some standard
utilities were taken and sequenes of random bits were fed into them. The probability of rash
turned out to be embarrassingly large. (Authors' note)
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universal test in the lass onsidered. This is due to an important strutural dif-
ferene between the enumerable sets and the arithmeti sets: universal set exists
for enumerable sets but not for the arithmeti ones.
Then we may make another, more radial, suggestion [5℄: let us onsider all the
theorems of the form for almost all x, P (x), where P is a formula in some
language. There are ountably many theorems of this form, and their set is re-
ursively enumerable. Eah of these theorems orresponds to a set of measure 1
(sequenes for whih P is true). Consider the intersetion of all these sets. The
-additivity (ountable additivity) of the measure guarantees that this interse-
tion also has measure 1. Let us take this intersetion as the set of random
sequenes. Then by denition all the theorems of probability theory (provably
true for almost all sequenes) are true for the sequenes from this set; however, we
enounter then other diulties (related to the basi problems in the foundations
of set theory, like the absene of the set of all sets, et.)
More subtle versions of this approah an be onsidered, but they are based on
rather deliate tehniques of the set theory. For example, instead a provably
minimal set we may onsider a set whih would be minimal in a onsistent way:
this means that it is impossible to prove that it is not minimal. The existene
of suh a set is not at all evident; the proof makes use of ne tehniques of the
set theory. To give an informal image of this approah we may ompare it with
the presumption of innoene. A sequene must always be presumed random; if
it is suspeted not to be suh, it must be taken to ourt; but in the absene of
any proofs whatsoever of its guilt the sequene must be exonerated (that is,
onsidered as random) for the benet of the doubt.
Aknowledgement. The authors are grateful to Alexander Shen for many
helpful omments.
Bibliography
[1℄ A. Blass and Y. Gurevih, Algorithms: a quest for absolute denitions, Bull.
EATCS 81 (Ot. 2003), p. 195-225.
[2℄ G. Chaitin, On the length of programs for omputing nite binary sequenes
by bounded-transfer Turing mahines, AMS Noties 13 (1966), p. 133.
[3℄ G. Chaitin, On the length of programs for omputing nite binary sequenes
by bounded-transfer Turing mahines II, AMS Noties 13 (1966), p. 228-229.
[4℄ G. Chaitin, Computational omplexity and Gödel's inompleteness theorem,
AMS Noties 17 (1970), p. 672.
[5℄ B. Durand, V. Kanovei, V. Uspensky and N. Vereshhagin, Do stronger
denitions of randomness exist?, Theoret. Comput. Si. 290 (2003), no. 3,
p. 1987-1996.
[6℄ B. Durand and S. Porrot, Comparison between the omplexity of a funtion
and the omplexity of its graph, Theoret. Comput. Si. 271 (2002), no. 1-2,
p. 37-46.
[7℄ B. Durand, A. Shen and N. Vereshhagin, Desriptive omplexity of om-
putable sequenes, Theoret. Comput. Si. 271, (2002), no. 1-2, p. 47-58.
[8℄ Y. Gurevih, On Kolmogorov mahines and related issues, Bull. EATCS 35
(June 1988), p. 71-82.
[9℄ D. Hofstadter, Gödel, Esher, Bah: An Eternal Golden Braid, Basi Books,
1979.
[10℄ A. N. Kolmogorov, Three approahes to the denition of the onept of quan-
tity of information (in Russian), Problemy Peredahi Informatsii 1 (1965),
no. 1, p. 3-11.
[11℄ A. N. Kolmogorov and V. A. Uspensky, On the denition of an algorithm,
Translations, series 2, Amer. Math. So. 29 (1963), p. 217-245. (Translated
from Uspekhi Mat. Nauk 13 (1958), no. 4, p. 3-28.)
19
20 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[12℄ L. Levin, The onept of a random sequene, Soviet Math. Doklady 212
(1973), p. 1413-1416.
[13℄ M. Li and P. Vitányi, An Introdution to Kolmogorov Complexity and its
Appliations, Graduate Texts in Computer Siene, Springer-Verlag (New
York), 1997 (2nd edition).
[14℄ D. W. Loveland, A variant of Kolmogorov onept of omplexity, Information
and Control 15 (1969), p. 510-526.
[15℄ P. Martin-Löf, The denition of random sequenes, Information and Control
9 (1966), p. 602-619.
[16℄ C. P. Shnorr, Proess omplexity and eetive random sets, J. Comput.
System Si. 7 (1973), p. 376-388.
[17℄ D. Shasha and C. Lazere, Out of Their Minds: The Lives and Disoveries
of 15 Great Computer Sientists, Copernius, 1995.
[18℄ R. J. Solomono, A formal theory of indutive inferene, I, Information and
Control 7 (1964), p. 1-22.
[19℄ V. Uspensky and A. Semenov, Algorithms: Main Ideas and Appliations
(transl. from Russian by A. Shen), Kluwer, 1993.
[20℄ V. Uspensky, A. Semenov and A. Shen, Can an (individual) sequene of zeros
and ones be random?, Russian Math. Surveys 45 (1990), no. 1, p. 121-189.
[21℄ A. K. Zvonkin and L. Levin, The omplexity of nite objets and the de-
velopment of the onepts of information and randomness by means of the
theory of algorithms, Russian Math. Surveys 25 (1970), no. 6, p. 83-124.
